Insper Institute of Education and Research
Rua Quatá 300, Office 720
São Paulo– SP, Brazil, 04546-042
Research interests: Corporate Finance, Banking, Household Finance, Development Economics
Abstract: I provide evidence of a new channel through which politicians can exchange favors with campaign donors: earlier payment in procurement contracts. I explore an electoral reform that bans corporate contributions and partially breaks down the relationship between donors and politicians. Using a within-firm difference-in-differences identification strategy, I find that the payment period to firms that donate to the coalition government increases after the reform. The effect is larger in municipalities with low liquidity and for contracts allocated through competitive procurement methods. My results point to the importance of designing rules that curb discretion over payment dates.
Abstract: This paper documents how violence resulting from the Mexican Drug War hindered local export growth. Focusing on exports allows us to abstract from demand factors and measure effects on the local capacity to supply foreign markets. We compare exports of the same product to the same country, but facing differential exposure to violence after a close electoral outcome. Firms exogenously exposed to the Drug War experienced lower export growth. Violence eroded the local capacity to attract capital investment, disproportionately hampering large exporters and capital-intensive activities.
Abstract: We study how banks restructure their operations after M&As and the implications for bank outcomes and credit provision. We leverage rich data at the branch level of private Brazilian banks, including labor force characteristics and financial information such as assets, liabilities, revenues, and costs. The consolidated conglomerates engage in substantial resources reallocation compared to their private counterparts. Acquirer and target branches are restructured on different margins. Labor is reallocated towards acquirer branches, which experience an increase in the quality of their loan officers. Restructuring increases profitability in both acquirer and target branches, in markets where the event leads to a meaningful increase in market power and in markets where it does not. Improvements in lending provision and deposits collection at acquirer branches, and cost reduction in target branches are behind this increase in profitability. Our results point out that restructuring is an essential value-creation mechanism of M&As above and beyond concentration gains, and that it reshapes the provision of financial services across the branch network of the new conglomerate.
Bank branches, crime and financial technology adoption: evidence from Brazil
Publication in Refereed Brazilian Journal
Idiosyncratic Moments and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns in Brazil, Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Vol. 36, 2, 255-286, 2016. (with Caio Almeida and Cristina Tessari)